Interview with Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP and former Secretary General of NATO with CROSSROADS.

1. Your Excellency, the release of the second edition of “Crossroads” will coincide with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Right now, the EU is transcending the axis of “soft power” versus “hard power”, trying to combine these concepts into some European version of a new concept of “smart power”. In this context, please tell us what do you think about the past records and future challenges ahead of European Security and Defense Policy and can you give us some hints about the future institutional development of the EU capacities for foreign and security policies, especially your visions on the nascent European diplomatic, military and intelligence capacities?

The record is extremely positive. Last year, the European Union conducted 10 operations with around 10 000 men and women serving in them. Their impact is significant. The EU is providing the “key enablers” for peace and stability. The global reach and the scope of these different operations is striking. Across three continents, they cover the spectrum from ‘pure’ military operations - through security sector reform and institution-building - to police and rule-of- law missions.

The demand on the EU is increasing. But the structures, the tools we need to equip us for the 21st Century and to be more efficient and effective, remain unchanged. Many of these tools were contained in the draft Constitution and I welcome the efforts under way now to re-launch the process of institutional change in the EU.

Last year, in the light of six years of experience and in response to the mandate I received from the EU Heads of State and Government at Hampton Court, I decided to make a number of simple changes to strengthen the coherence and the assessment and implementation capacity in Brussels. For example, following the practice in a number of Member States and following the demands of past Operation Commanders, we have brought together the civilian and military intelligence and assessment capacity. To strengthen the civilian chain of command, we will have a civilian operation commander for our civilian missions. A watch-keeping facility intended to provide a more comprehensive service to communicate with our missions on the ground will be established. We will also establish closer and more systematic coordination between civilian and military staffs. Finally, the facilities of our Operations Centre are ready to be used, thereby increasing the possibilities for and flexibility of an EU military response as well as the overall capacity of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

2.    Coming back to our region of Southeast Europe, there is widespread concern that the enlargement process will grind to a halt for many years to come. If we compare “Agenda 2000” with the present “Integration Capacity Report” it is not quite obvious that there is a clear and coherent strategy for the future of the enlargement process. Isn’t the European project as an endeavor for the creation of “Europe as a community of shared values” seriously threatened by the present lack of vision and strategy for the future of the enlargement process?

Let me start saying a few general words about enlargement. Enlargement has clearly contributed to growth and prosperity in Europe. It has also enabled us to broaden the area of peace, stability, democracy, rule of law and prosperity throughout our continent. The wider internal market and economic cooperation have increased prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged EU to respond better to the challenges of globalisation. Enlargement has also enhanced the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international partner. The next few years will be an opportunity to consolidate the basis of the existing Union of twenty-seven Member States.

As for the EU’s enlargement strategy, I do believe that there is a clear strategy for the enlargement process for years to come, around which there is a general consensus within the EU. Last December, the European Council agreed that the enlargement strategy should be based on the principles of consolidation, conditionality and communication. This, combined with the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, forms the basis for a renewed consensus on enlargement. This new consensus is the result of more than a year of discussions in the Council.

The European Council also concluded that to sustain the integration capacity of the EU acceding countries must be ready and able fully to assume the obligations of EU membership and the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop. The pace of the accession process depends on the progress with reforms. Each country is judged on its own merits.

Finally, as regards the Western Balkans, the European Council in December again reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union, and that progress towards this goal will depend on each country’s individual efforts in complying with the EU’s conditions and requirements.  

3. You have visited Macedonia on numerous occasions and in different capacities and your role was very significant in the efforts leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. What are your impressions and reflections on this period? Did these events really mark the turning point for EU crisis-responsiveness and what is your opinion on the progress of Macedonia’s parallel bids for fully-fledged membership of the EU and NATO?

In 2001 the EU, together with its international partners, acted early and decisively to prevent the crisis from deteriorating. We maintained contact with all political parties, fostered dialogue, and helped to broker a political agreement at Ohrid. The Ohrid Framework Agreement allowed for peace to be re-established and provided a basis for improved inter-ethnic relations. The progress made since then with in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement is a remarkable achievement and was central to the decision to grant candidate status. Its continued and sustained implementation will remain key to the further progress of EU integration.  

The country has, in a spirit of partnership, been the place of many firsts in the development of the EU’s foreign policy tools. The EU has shown not only that it is capable of taking action but also that it can adapt its support to specific situations and specific needs. In March 2003, operation Concordia, the first EU-led military operation, took over from the NATO mission in the country. Its main aim was to contribute to a stable environment and to allow for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In December 2003, Concordia handed over to the second-ever ESDP police mission, Proxima, aimed at supporting the development of a police service based on European standards. The ESDP presence finally ended in June 2006 with the closing of Proxima’s successor, the EU Police Advisory Team. Today, as these crisis-management tools have fulfilled their mission and left, the pre-accession instruments represent the bulk of the EU’s  engagement.

The question regarding progress towards NATO membership is better answered by my colleagues at NATO. As for the EU membership bid, the December 2005 decision to grant candidate status was a recognition of progress achieved and an encouragement to move ahead in the EU reform process. At the same time, it was also made clear that much remained to be done. In December 2006, the European Council reviewed progress over the past year and called on the Government to further step up reform efforts in order to progress towards the goal of moving ahead in the accession process. Experience from earlier enlargements shows that in order to make sustained progress, it is important that the political forces - both the majority and the minority and the President and the Government - unify their efforts on important reforms. The EU, and myself, will of course continue to be available to advise and assist. But the key to further progress lies in the country’s own hands.

4. In course of 2007 the ESDP will be high on EU agenda. We are expecting a gradual pullout of the EU police mission from Bosnia as well as undertaking a large-scale operation in Kosovo. The projected ambitious mission in Kosovo will be the largest and most expensive EU operation to date. Will the EU be able to cope effectively with securing internal stability in Kosovo, providing assistance for sustainability of the institutions in Kosovo, as well as with control of its “sensitive” borders?

The EU, in partnership with the Kosovo authorities and all international stakeholders in Kosovo, and in particular NATO, will be able to cope effectively with securing the internal stability of Kosovo. The EU’s presence will be as light as possible, in line with the objective of maximum local ownership and responsibility, but as robust as necessary in order to contribute to the sustainability of local institutions and the implementation of the status settlement. The Council has endorsed an approach under which the envisaged ESDP mission would provide mentoring, monitoring and advice in the broad field of rule of law; it would also have executive responsibilities in some areas of police, including crowd and riot control; justice; and customs. This would be the largest and most complex civilian ESDP mission to date and would be the first civilian ESDP mission with executive powers. Planning is based on the assumption that there will be a new UN Security Council Resolution establishing a clear mandate for the EU. Many parameters of the future mission will be affected by the final status of Kosovo and the EU’s planning assumptions are under constant review to ensure that the mission will be able to fulfill its tasks. Cooperation with the local authorities and with all international actors in Kosovo is of crucial importance and EU planning is progressing in full transparency with the local authorities and with the international community.

5. Before taking over the position of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy you served as NATO Secretary General. During both of these terms of office you had to exercise the art of transformational leadership and to manage an organization while reshaping its identity, mission and global responsibilities. This is why you are the best person who can answer the question about the future relations and “division of labor” between EU and NATO? Are they complimentary, mutually exclusive or everything depends on the leadership and visionary thinking on both sides of the Atlantic?

NATO and the EU both seek to determine the most appropriate response to crises and to achieve effective crisis management. This is what their cooperation is about. From the outset, the EU-NATO relationship has been about consultation, cooperation and transparency between two partners standing on an equal footing. These principles are enshrined in the agreed framework of EU-NATO relations.

More important than principles on paper is the fact that indeed, together, we have managed to make these principles work  very well in practice. This has been the case each time the EU has led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. The launching of Concordia in 2003 was a benchmark in this respect. Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is another good example of fruitful cooperation ongoing between the EU and NATO. Whenever the EU acted autonomously, as was the case in military operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, we took all the steps and safeguards to ensure that NATO was kept fully in the loop. Another area which has functioned particularly well is cooperation on military capabilities regarding overlapping requirements, and this is something crucial because obviously we do not want to see any unnecessary duplication of what are - for the EU as for NATO - limited assets and capabilities of the Member States.

Taking all this into account, I do not think it is fair to talk either of a division of labour or, on the other hand, of a beauty contest. In fact, the EU and NATO complement each other and each intervenes in a given theatre using its specific instruments. In the EU’s case, we have this innate ability to pull together a full range of instruments (military and civilian), supplemented by strong and sustained financial assistance and supported by an underlying political approach defined by the EU foreign ministers.